In a particularly crucial regard, the Trump Doctrine differs from the Obama Doctrine for U.S. involvement with Afganistan — the American troop presence shifting from a determined to an indefinite withdrawal.
While the previous policy was to reduce U.S. forces as assistance in improving Afgan security components showed effective progress, the new one principally emphasizes militarily denaturing the Taliban insurgency. Complemented by permanency of a stable, un-threatened Afgan government — two contingencies, then, that could keep this country perpetually “Afganistanned.”
Whenever referencing the current Afgan-U.S. embrace, news accounts invariably observe: “…the longest war in U.S. history.” At 16 years, it certainly is.
So, if after 16 years and, at peak strength, 100,000 American troops aiding in Afgan battles, the conflict continues, what are the chances essentially more of the same but with fewer boots on the ground — currently 6,941 G.I.s — will produce a sudden fix?
Additionally, goals described by the U.S. president in his recent national address will require more than a prolonged military garrison. The essential stabilization he mentioned will also include an augmented American financial investment. For unknowable years.
Again, analysis of preceding Afganistan involvement reports an accumulated U.S. cost, rounded, at $1 trillion. Even more unsettling, the so-called presidential expository included no real specifics as to either strategy or tactics. Just a vague reassurance that the “new” plan will confer victory and, presumably, peace. Which seems to be enveloped somewhere in the dimming mists of time.
Reason, however, implies that tens of millions more in American treasure will be required as U.S. forces in Afganistan probably increase, as that corrupt and war-battered far-off country’s economy and government are to be permanently strengthened, while pay-outs are conveyed to politically disturbed neighbors Pakistan and India.
And as the Trump Doctrine siphons multiple billions from the federal treasury, what becomes of the man’s campaign promise of a gloriously restored America, benefitting from a spanking new infrastructure, vanished budget deficits, a national health system envied by the world, job growth so extraordinary it will revive a middle class unimagined in its historic proportions and tax reform calculated to support all this munificence promptly and affordably?
But even beyond that, from where, in the face of past lessons learned – Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, even Afganistan – will the American patience derive permitting engagement in a costly, deadly, twilight struggle directly involving personal and national sacrifice so Afganistan can finally emerge free, honest, and self-sufficient, no longer a threat to U.S. security?
Will all the normal, consequential political debate subside for the duration? Will Americans generally, especially the restive underemployed; the unemployed; the economically disadvantaged minorities, indefinitely await while Afganistan’s need for better roads, bridges, power grids, job opportunities, cultural diversity and sectarian tolerance is eventually met?
Perhaps these concerns develop from the fact that at its unveiling the Trump Doctrine for triumph in disheveled Afganistan lacked real answers for the natural questions it provoked. So, Americans can at least be excused if they demand more detailed explanation of what the proclaimed “new” exit route means to them and their country other than what it look like: an even longer road, including even more treacherous traffic, plus burdensomely expensive tolls.
Harry E. Fuller Jr., a Park City resident, is a retired Salt Lake Tribune editorial page editor and chief editorial writer.